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Article 10

INDIANA LAIWF JOURNAL
be impaired by subsequent legislation.18 The United States Supreme Court
has held that a contract between a State and a party, whereby he is to perform
certain duties for a specific period19 at a stipulated compensation, is within
the protection of the Constitution and that it is not affected by the repeal
of the statute pursuant to which it was made. 2 0 On the other hand, there is
little or no authority favoring the proposition that a state can invalidate its
teachers' contracts by subsequent legislation.
On the whole, the holding of this case seems to be a departure from
practically all the authorities. It seems to go as far as to hold that the
Legislature is free to annul any contract entered into by the State under the
authorization of a prior legislative enactment. In other words, it puts such
a contract on a parity with a mere license in so far as revocation is concerned.
2
On the other hand, the well-reasoned dissenting opinion of Judge Treanor l
is supported by both logic and authorities and the constitutional problems
which he points out might be made the basis of an appeal to the Supreme
Court of the United States.
W. I. M.
WILLs-REvocATIoN.-Testator wrote "void" on the margin of his will and
across the envelope containing it, and drew intersecting diagonal lines across
the writing of the will. These lines started just below the title and extended
through the body of the will, through testator's signature, through the attestation clause, and stopped just above the signatures of the witnesses. It was
conceded that the testator intended thereby to revoke the will. The only
question in the case was whether or not testator's acts were sufficient, under
the Indiana statute, to effect a revocation.
Held, the will had not been
revoked.1
The English Statute of Frauds provided that a will could be revoked only
by burning, canceling, tearing, or obliterating, or by another writing. 2 This
statute served as a model for the statutes in most of our states, in that those
statutes generally specify several methods of revocation. 3 Neither the Statute
of Frauds nor the statutes of any of the states attempted to define the specific
acts that a testator must perform in order to revoke his will by one of the
methods prescribed. Consequently, in the development of the law on the
subject there was much litigation, and a proportionate amount of confusion
of thought in the early cases. The Statute of Victoria, which repealed parts
18 State, ex rel. Nyberg v. Milwaukee Board (1926), 190 Wis. 570, 209
N. W 683.
19There seems to be no valid objection to the tenure contracts on the
ground that they are for an indefinite duration, because the contracts were
to continue in force until terminated by a method provided in the statute.
The Court did not have any trouble in granting the teacher the remedy of
mandamus before the Act of 1933. See State, ex rel. Black v. Board of School
Commissioners (1933), 205 Ind. 582, 187 N. E. 392; Kostanzer v. State, ex rel.
Ramsey (1933), 205 Ind. 536, 187 N. E. 337; Elwood v. State, ex rel. Griffin
(1932), 203 Ind. 626, 180 N. E. 471.
20 Hall v. Wisconsin (1880), 103 U. S. 5, 26 L. Ed. 302. See, also,
Carondelet Canal & Nay. Co. v. Louisiana (1913), 233 U. S. 362, 34 S. Ct. 627.
21 State, ex rel. Anderson v. Brand (Ind. 1937), 5 N. E. (2d) 913. See,
also, Opinions of the Attorney General of Indiana (1933), pp. 100, 139.
1 Tinsley v. Carwile (Ind. App., 1937), 5 N. E. (2d) 982.
2 29 Car. II, Ch. 3.
3 14 Iowa L. R. 283.

RECENT CASE NOTES
of the Statute of Frauds relating to wills, was probably responsible for the
confusion that arose over the meaning of the words "obliteration" and "cancellation," for it expressly provided that no obliteration or cancellation would
4
The words were
be given effect if the original words were still apparent.
still "apparent" if they could be read with the aid of a microscope. However,
it is now settled that cancellation will effect a revocation of a will even
5
The word "destroy," though commonly
though the writing is still legible.
used in the statutes, has been defined less frequently. Usually the statutes
contain other words, such as "cancellation," "tearing," and "burning," and
the courts have taken the easy way out through one of these words when
confronted with a question of revocation. However, the Supreme Court of
Indiana has said that "destroy" does not mean a destruction in a literal
sense of the fabric upon which the words are written, that the instrument is
6
sufficiently destroyed if the legal force thereof is divested or extinguished.
The original Indiana statute was to all practical purposes identical with
the English Statute of Frauds. It provided: "No will or testament in writing
*
* * shall be revoked, unless by burning, tearing, canceling, or obliterating
the same with the intention of revoking it * * *2,7 In the Revised Statutes
of 1852 these particularizing words were omitted and the statute was made
to read: "No will in writing * * * shall be revoked, unless the testator
with intent to revoke shall destroy, or mutilate the same * * * "8
0* *
The question as to what acts are sufficient to constitute a destruction or
mutilation under the Indiana statute has come before our Supreme Court in
only one case. That was the case of Woodfill v. Patton,O in which the
testator had drawn several lines through his signature with the intent thereby
to revoke his will. In holding the will revoked, the court declared that the
policy of our statute is to enlarge, rather than to limit, the methods of
revocation; that the language of the present statute is more comprehensive
than that of the former; that, unlike the English statute, it contains no
restrictive or particularizing words; that it embraces all acts amounting
to a mutilation or destruction, whether or not the acts are such as former
statutes or common law rules recognized as effective acts of revocation.
"Mutilate," said the court, "means something less than total destruction. It
means to render imperfect-to take from the instrument an element essential
to its validity. Purposely taking from a will the signature of the testator
deprives it of an essential part, and makes it so imperfect that it loses all
legal force and effect.' The court further said that the manner in which the
mutilation or destruction is effected is not of controlling importance; that
the act of marking out the siguature with a pen, pencil or other instrument
which erases, cancels, or obliterates it, is not less a mutilation than an act
4 7 Wm IV & 1 Vict., Ch. 26.
5 Michigan Trust Co. v. Fox (1916),

192 Mich. 699, 159 N. W 332; In
Re Love's Estate (1923), 186 N. C. 713, 120 S. E. 479; Stuart v. McWhorter
(1931), 238 Ky. 82, 36 S. W (2d) 842; Noesen v. Erkenswich (1921), 298
231, 131 N. E. 622; Meredith v. Meredith (Del., 1931), 157 A. 202; Page,
Ill.
Wills, vol. 1, sec. 406.
6 Woodfill v. Patton (1881), 76 Ind. 575.
7 R. S. 1843, Ch. 30, see. 29.
82 R. S. 1852, Ch. 11, see. 19.
976 Ind. 575 (1851).
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of tearing the signature from the instrument or removing it by a chemical
preparation.
The testator's signature in the Patton case was still "quite perceptible and
legible," said the court in its opinion. This fact is particularly notable and
pertinent because of the emphasis which the Appellate Court has placed on
the matter of legibility in the instant case. After quoting the definition of
"mutilate" from the Patton case, the Appellate Court stated.
"It can readily be seen in this case that the will is yet in its entirety, all
of it is entirely legible, no part has been destroyed, no element essential to
its validity has been removed therefrom, therefore, the legal force of the
will is not divested or extinguished."
And the court further said that the trial court correctly stated his conclusions
of law, and that the judgment was in all things affirmed. Part of the conclusions of law of the trial court are as follows:
* * * That to revoke a will there must be an intent by the testator
"3.
to destroy the whole of it or to destroy a material part of it by erasure or
removal, that a cancellation thereof is not sufficient even though the testator
intended that such will be thereby voided. There must be an intent to render
the will illegible in some material part thereof, even though the act partially
fails to so render it.
"4.*
* * That the Indiana statute, prescribing the manner in which and
by which wills can be revoked, was intended to prevent revocation by
",
*
cancellation

It seems evident that the court did not comprehend the significance of the
decision of the Supreme Court in Woodfill v. Patton, in which a revocation
was effected by lines drawn through testator's signature only, leaving the
In the instant case the testator drew lines
signature entirely legible.lO
through his signature and through every other part of the will except the
1
This action certainly took from
title and the signatures of the witnesses.
the will an element essential to its validity, and constituted a mutilation
within the declared meaning of that word.
The writer submits that the decision of the Appellate Court in this case
is not in harmony with the decision of the Supreme Court in Woodfill v.
Patton and that both decisions cannot stand as the law in Indiana.
R. H. N.
"His (testator's)
10 The Supreme Court in Woodfill v. Patton said.
signature thereto was much blackened by a considerable number of parallel
and circular lines and some cross-marks made by a common lead pencil
* 0 *, and the said signature, as a whole, still remained quite perceptible
and legible through said pencil marks * 0 0 If the signature were cut
or torn from the paper; if all traces were removed by a chemical preparation
there would be no room for controversy, it would plainly be a mutilation
of the will. It can not be any less a mutilation if the signature is marked
out with pen, pencil or other implement which erases, cancels or obliterates it."
Page, Wills, vol. 1, sec. 409" "Where the statute provides that if a will is
'mutilated' with intent to revoke it, such will is revoked; drawing pencil lines
across the signature, so as to deface it, but still leaving the signature legible,
constitutes a 'mutilation'" (citing Woodfill v. Patton).
11 See photostatic copy of will with the words and marking thereon, which
is incorporated in the opinion.

